The Regulatory Rationale of XBRL
Written by Troy Paredes Posted on September 26, 2007
Troy Paredes is a professor at Washington University School of Law, where he teaches corporations, securities regulation, and corporate finance. Mr. Paredes has written on a wide range of topics, including securities regulation, executive compensation, and hedge funds. Before joining Washington University’s faculty, Mr. Paredes was a corporate and regulatory lawyer. He is a graduate of Yale Law School.
The federal securities laws are all about disclosure. Mandatory disclosure is intended to give investors the information they need that is, to make markets more transparent so that investors can assess for themselves how best to allocate their capital. By arming the market with information, mandatory disclosure is designed to promote informed investor decision making and, relatedly, boost investor confidence and result in more efficient securities markets. Further, once mandatory disclosure empowers investors with information, there is no need for the government to engage in more substantive securities regulation that might find the government passing on the merits of a particular issuer and its securities. This full-disclosure philosophy has animated the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 since they were first adopted over 70 years ago.
The practical challenge has been in turning the philosophy of mandatory disclosure into an actual regulatory regime that works. Two things are needed for a disclosure-based regime like the federal securities laws to promote transparency. First, information has to be disclosed. That is relatively straightforward in concept, although deciding what exactly should be disclosed isn’t always so easy. Second, and too often overlooked, is that the users of information must be able to use mandated disclosures effectively. In other words, investors, analysts, and others must not only have access to information, but must be able to search, process, and interpret what is disclosed relatively easily and at low cost. Disclosures that aren’t understandable don’t do much good. A recent report by Robert Pozen, who is heading the SEC Advisory Committee on Improvements to Financial Reporting, has embellished on this point. He explained in a recent Discussion Paper for the Advisory Committee (”Discussion Paper”) that users of financial information want:
–To understand the financial reports, at the level of detail that is desired by each type of user;
–To be able to rely on the integrity of the financial reports (and not be told later they were incomplete, misleading, or actually wrong);
–The financial reports to reflect the economic substance of the business, regardless of technical rules;
–Financial reports to reflect, to the extent feasible, actual changes in market values from period to period; and
–The reports to be delivered in a format that makes it easy to compare one company to another.
Likewise, in the mid-1990s, the SEC’s Task Force on Disclosure Simplification remarked in its report that disclosures must be understandable, complete and timely. It is hard to disagree with this assessment.
The enduring question is how best to achieve more understandable, complete, and timely disclosures. Asked differently, under what circumstances does disclosure actually advance transparency?
When more transparency is called for, the typical regulatory response is to require more disclosure. Indeed, the federal securities laws mandate that companies disclose oodles of information. For example, companies must make extensive disclosures in their registration statements, annual reports, quarterly reports, and proxies, the principal filings a public company must make with the SEC. More information must be disclosed now than ever. Additionally, many companies voluntarily disclose even more information than the law requires.
However, it is not enough simply to call for more disclosure. (In fact, as a result of so-called information overload, it is possible that users of information may make worse decisions when faced with more and more information, in which event more disclosure may actually lead to less transparency.) To promote transparency, it is also important to focus on the presentation and formatting of what is disclosed.
There are numerous ways to reformat disclosures so they are more understandable and thus more useful. One simple technique, which the SEC has increasingly used, is to require disclosure through graphs, charts, and tables. The SEC’s executive compensation disclosure requirements illustrate the possibilities. Another example is plain English, which requires that certain disclosures be made in “plain English” (as opposed to legalese).
The leading initiative that SEC Chairman Cox has been pushing to promote transparency since he got to the SEC is XBRL. Chairman Cox, correctly in my view, sees XBRL as holding out promise for meaningfully revamping how disclosures are formatted and presented and thus for increasing the value of what is disclosed. Without question, the technicalities of XBRL are challenging. Not least of all, an agreed-to set of tags must be crafted. Further, any time there is a change in disclosure, some legal uncertainty is introduced. And with legal uncertainty comes concern about legal liability.
The potential benefits of XBRL, however, are considerable. XBRL makes it cheaper and easier for investors and other users of information to access information. It’s just not the ability to access information that matters. Anybody can relatively easily access an issuer’s disclosures by looking at the issuer’s most recent quarterly or annual report on line. The next step is the ability to manipulate the information that is available. XBRL will effectively allow a user to package the information that is disclosed as the user sees fit given its interests and objectives. Again, as Pozen recently put it in his Discussion Paper:
The SEC is engaged in a major project to introduce interactive data tagging technology for the informational content of financial reports, such as through the use of XBRL, so that users have the ability to quickly and easily focus on the important information they desire in these reports. Moreover, tagging of information may allow investors to customize their needs based on their desired level of detail. The tagging of information can be focused on performance metrics for carrying out the strategy of a specific company and could be designed along the lines of a balanced scorecard. The tagging of information can be organized into a variety of standard formats for key performance indicators (KPIs) organized by industry. . . .
If XBRL is successfully extended from tagging financial information to tagging narrative disclosures, its benefits are even greater. Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations (MD&A) is a particularly key set of disclosures that a company makes in its SEC filings. However, the MD&A is narrative and, given that the MD&A can run several pages, it can be difficult to wade through and digest in a timely manner. Alan Beller, when he was Director of the SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance, suggested that companies give a summary of the full-blown MD&A. As Beller reportedly put it, Current MD&A goes on endlessly about stuff that investors can find on the balance sheet. They don’t need 10 pages of elevator music. Unfortunately, elevator music is often what investors and analysts get. Not only do the users not need this noise, but the elevator music can obscure the important information that investors and other users do want. The ability to tag MD&A disclosures could render this information much more valuable to investors, analysts, and others.
The bottom line is that XBRL makes the same body of information much more searchable and understandable. Consequently, XBRL should lead to more transparency and thus better decision-making by users.


Bob Schneider is a Partner in
Wilson So is the Director of Hitachi America, Ltd. 
